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Secrecy capacities of compound quantum wiretap channels and applications
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We determine the secrecy capacity of the compound channel with quantum wiretapper and channel
state information at the transmitter. Moreover, we derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of
this channel without channel state information and determine the secrecy capacity of the compound
classical-quantum wiretap channel with channel state information at the transmitter. We use this
result to derive a proof for a lower bound on the entanglement generating capacity of the compound
quantum channel. We also derive a proof for the formula for entanglement generating capacity of
the compound quantum channel with channel state information at the encoder which was given
in additional information (cf. I. Bjelakovic´, H. Boche, and J. No¨tzel, Proceedings of International
Symposium on Information Theory ISIT, 1889-1893, Korea, 2009).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our goal is to analyze information transmission over a
set of indexed channels, which is called a compound chan-
nel. The indices are referred to as channel states. Only
one channel in this set is actually used for the information
transmission, but the users can not control which chan-
nel in the set will be used. The capacity of the classical
compound channel was determined in [14].
A compound channel with an eavesdropper is called a
compound wiretap channel. We define a compound wire-
tap channel as a family of pairs of channels {(Wt,Vt) :
t = 1, . . . , T }with a common input alphabet and possibly
different output alphabets, connecting a sender with two
receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper, where t stands for
the state of the channel pair (Wt,Vt). The legitimate re-
ceiver accesses the output of the first channel Wt in the
pair (Wt,Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output
of the second part Vt in the pair (Wt,Vt), respectively,
when a state t governs the channel. A code for the chan-
nel conveys information to the legal receiver such that
the wiretapper’s knowledge of the transmitted informa-
tion can be kept arbitrarily small. This is a generaliza-
tion of Wyner’s classical wiretap channel [42] to a case of
multiple channel states. In [42], the author required that
the wiretapper can not detect the message using a weak
security criterion (cf. Remark 2). For the achievable se-
crecy rate, we use the worst-case interpretation, i.e., it is
limited by the secrecy rate when the destination has the
worst channel state.
We deal with two communication scenarios. In the first
one, only the sender is informed about the index t, or in
other words, he has CSI, where CSI is an abbreviation
for “channel state information”. In the second one, both
the sender and the receiver do not have any information
about that index at all.
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The classical compound wiretap channels were intro-
duced in [28]. A lower bound on the classical secrecy ca-
pacity was obtained under the condition that the sender
does not have any knowledge about the CSI. In [28], the
authors required that the receiver’s average error goes to
zero and that the wiretapper is not able to detect the
message, with respect to the same security criterion as
in [42]. The result of [28] was improved in [13] by us-
ing a stronger condition for the limit of the legitimate
receiver’s error, i.e., the maximal error should go to zero,
as well as a stronger condition for the security criterion
(c.f. Remark 2). Furthermore, the secrecy capacity was
determined for the case in which the sender had knowl-
edge about the CSI.
In this paper, we consider quantum channels. A quan-
tum channel can transmit both classical and quantum
information. We consider the capacity of quantum chan-
nels carrying classical information. This is equivalent to
considering the capacity of classical-quantum channels,
where the classical-quantum channels are quantum chan-
nels whose sender’s inputs are classical variables. The
classical capacity of quantum channels has been deter-
mined in [23], [24], [34], and [35]. In general, there are
two ways to represent a quantum channel with linear al-
gebraic tools (cf. e.g. Section VII), either as a sum of
several transformations, or as a single unitary transfor-
mation which explicitly includes the unobserved environ-
ment. We use the latter one for our result in the entan-
glement generating capacity. These two representations
can both be used to determine the entanglement gener-
ating capacity for quantum channels, but it is unknown
if this holds for the entanglement generating capacity of
compound quantum channels.
We analyze two variants of compound wiretap quan-
tum channels in this paper. The first variant is called
the classical compound channel with quantum wiretap-
per. In this channel model, we assume that the wiretap
channels are quantum channels, while the legal transmis-
sion channels are classical channels. The second variant
is called the compound classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel. In this channel model, we assume that both fami-
lies of channels are quantum channels, while the sender
transmits classical information.
A quantum wiretap channel is described by a map N
which maps the set of density operators on a system GA
to the set of density operators on a composite system
GBZ. Here, GA is the the system of the sender, GB
is the system observed by the legal receiver, and GZ is
the system observed by the wiretapper. We only allow
passive eavesdropping attacks, i.e., the actions which the
wiretapper performs on his system have no influence on
the legal receiver’s system. For active eavesdropping at-
tacks, i.e., the actions which the wiretapper performs on
his system have influences on the legal receiver’s sys-
tem, c.f. please arbitrarily varying quantum channels,
which are generalizations of compound quantum chan-
nels ([2], [10], [15], [1], and [17]). Following [19], we
define a quantum wiretap channel with passive eaves-
dropping attacks as a pair of channels (W,V ). For every
density operator ζ on GA we define W (ζ) := trB(N(ζ))
and V (ζ) := trZ(N(ζ)).
References[8] and [7] are two well-known examples for
secure quantum information transmission using quantum
key distributions. Good one-shot results for quantum
channels with a wiretapper who is limited in his actions
have been obtained. But our goal is to have a more
general theory for channel security in quantum informa-
tion theory, i.e. message transmission should be secure
against every possible kind of eavesdropping. Further-
more, we are interested in asymptotic behavior when we
deliver a large volume of messages by many channel uses.
Therefore, we consider an alternate paradigm for the de-
sign of quantum channel systems, which is called embed-
ded security. Here, we embed protocols with a guaran-
teed security into the bottom layerof the model of com-
munications systems, which is the physical layer. We use
channels, for example, fiber-optic cables, for generating
and transmitting secure messages which generate secure
keys, or secure message transmissions.
Since we allow every possible kind of eavesdropping,
we use the Holevo χ quantity as our security criterion
(cf. (13)). By [24] and [35] the wiretapper can never ob-
tain more information asymptotically than the Holevo χ
quantity, no matter which strategy the wiretapper uses.
Another widely used security criterion is the variational
distance between pApZ and pAZ . Here pAZ is the joint
probability describing the sender’s random variable and
the wiretapper’s random variable. pA is the marginal
probability describing the sender’s random variable and
pZ is the marginal probability describing the wiretap-
per’s random variable, respectively. The Holevo χ quan-
tity using a strong condition for the security criterion
(c.f. Remark 2) is stronger than the variational distance
between pApZ and pAZ in the sense that if the Holevo
χ quantity between pA and the wiretap channel’s out-
put (using strong condition) goes to zero, the variational
distance between pApZ and pAZ goes to zero as well (cf.
[21] and [16]).
Our results are summarized as follows. Under the con-
dition that the sender has knowledge about the CSI, the
secrecy capacity for these two channel models is derived.
Additionally, when the sender does not have any knowl-
edge about the CSI, we determine the secrecy capacity
of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel, and
give a lower bound for the secrecy capacity of the classical
compound channel with quantum wiretapper.
As an application of the above results, we turn to the
question: “What is the maximal amount of entanglement
that we can generate or transmit over a given compound
quantum channel?” For the sender and the receiver, the
objective is to share a nearly maximally entangled state
on a (2nR × 2nR) dimensional Hilbert space by using
a large number n instances of the compound quantum
channel. In [5] it is shown how to send a large amount
of entangled quantum states through a noisy quantum
channel such that the channel does not modify the entan-
glement. However, the study of entanglement generation
allows a noisy quantum channel to modify the entan-
glement, as long as the transmitters can use a recovery
algorithm to restore the entanglement. The entangle-
ment generating capacity of a quantum channel has been
determined in [20] and [29]. The entanglement generat-
ing capacities of a compound quantum channel with and
without CSI have been determined in [11] and [12]. In
our paper we derive a lower bound on the entanglement
generating capacity of the compound quantum channel
by using an alternative technique to the method in [11]
and [12] (cf. Section VII). Furthermore, we derive the en-
tanglement generating capacity of the compound quan-
tum channel with CSI at the encoder using an alternative
technique.
The main definitions are given in Section II.
In Section III, we present some known results for the
classical compound wiretap channel which are used for
the proof of the results in Section IV.
In Section IV, we discuss the classical compound chan-
nel with a quantum wiretapper. For the case when the
sender has the full knowledge about the CSI, we derive
the secrecy capacity. For the case when the sender does
not know the CSI, we give a lower bound for the se-
crecy capacity. In this channel model the wiretapper uses
classical-quantum channels.
In Section V, we derive the secrecy capacity of the
compound classical-quantum wiretap channel with CSI.
In this model both the receiver and the wiretapper use
classical quantum channels and the set of the channel
states may be finite or infinite.
In Section VI, we use the results of Section V to derive
a lower bound on the entanglement generating capacity
for the compound quantum channel. The entanglement
generating capacity of the compound quantum channel
with CSI at the encoder is also derived.
In Section VII, we discuss our proof of the previous
section and remind the reader about the two ways to
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represent a quantum channel with linear algebraic tools.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a finite set B, we denote the set of probability
distributions on B by P (B). Let ρ1 and ρ2 be Hermitian
operators on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space
G. We say ρ1 ≥ ρ2 and ρ2 ≤ ρ1 if ρ1 − ρ2 is positive-
semidefinite. For a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space G, we denote the set of density operators on G by
S(G) := {ρ ∈ L(G) : ρ is Hermitian, ρ ≥ 0G , tr(ρ) = 1} ,
where L(G) is the set of linear operators on G, and 0G is
the null matrix on G. Note that any operator in S(G) is
bounded.
For finite sets A and B, we define a (discrete) classical
channel V: A → P (B), A ∋ x → V(x) ∈ P (B) to be a
system characterized by a probability transition matrix
V(·|·). For x ∈ A and y ∈ B, V(y|x) expresses the proba-
bility of the output symbol y when we send the symbol x
through the channel. The channel is said to be memory-
less if the probability distribution of the output depends
only on the input at that time and is conditionally inde-
pendent of previous channel inputs and outputs.
Let n ∈ N. For a finite set A we define An :=
{(a1, . . . , an) : ai ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. For a finite set
A and a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H , the
space which the vector {v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vn : vi ∈ H ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , n}} span is defined by H⊗n. We also write an
and vn for the elements of An and H⊗n, respectively.
Let n ∈ N. For a discrete random variable X on a
finite set A, and a discrete random variable Y on a finite
set B, we denote the Shannon entropy by H(X) and the
mutual information between X and Y by I(X ;Y ) (cf.
[40]).
For a probability distribution P on a finite set A, a
conditional stochastic matrix Λ, and a positive constant
δ, we denote the set of typical sequences by T nP,δ and the
set of conditionally typical sequences by T nΛ,δ(xn) (here
we use the strong condition) (cf. [40]).
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces G and
G′, a quantum channel V : S(G) → S(G′), S(G) ∋
ρ → V (ρ) ∈ S(G′) is represented by a completely posi-
tive trace preserving map, which accepts input quantum
states in S(G) and produces output quantum states in
S(G′).
If the sender wants to transmit a classical message
m ∈ M to the receiver using a quantum channel, his
encoding procedure will include a classical-to-quantum
encoder M → S(G) to prepare a quantum message state
ρ ∈ S(G) suitable as an input for the channel. If the
sender’s encoding is restricted to transmitting an indexed
finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G), then we
can consider the choice of the signal quantum states ρx to
be a component of the channel. Thus, we obtain a chan-
nel with classical inputs x ∈ A and quantum outputs:
σx := V (ρx), which we call a classical-quantum channel.
This is a map V: A → S(G′), X ∋ x → V(x) ∈ S(G′)
which is represented by the set of |A| possible output
quantum states {σx = V(x) := V (ρx) : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G′),
meaning that each classical input of x ∈ A leads to a
distinct quantum output σx ∈ S(G′).
Let n ∈ N. Following [40] we define the n-th memo-
ryless extension of the stochastic matrix V by Vn, i.e.,
for xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An and yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Bn,
V
n(yn|xn) = ∏ni=1 V(yi|xi). Following [40], we define
the n-th extension of quantum channel and classical-
quantum channel as follows. Associated with V and V
are the channel maps on an n-block V ⊗n: S(G⊗n) →
S(G′⊗n) and V⊗n: An → S(G′⊗n), such that for any
ρn = ρ1⊗· · ·⊗ρn ∈ S(G⊗n) and any xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
An, V ⊗n(ρn) = V (ρ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ V (ρn), and V⊗nt (xn) =
V(x1)⊗ · · ·⊗ V(xn), respectively. Although the outcomes
of V ⊗n can be written as n tuples, we still regard them as
elements of S(G⊗n) because for the proof of our results,
we need tools which are defined on the space G⊗n (c.f.
(1)-(7)).
Let A be a finite set and G be a finite-dimensional
complex Hilbert space. For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(G),
we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ by
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. Fol-
lowing [3], for P ∈ P (A) the conditional entropy of the
channel for V with input distribution P is denoted by
S(V|P ) :=
∑
x∈A
P (x)S(V(x)) .
Remark 1 The following definition is a more general
definition of conditional entropy in quantum informa-
tion theory. Let P and Q be quantum systems. We
denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by GP and GQ,
respectively. Let φPQ be a bipartite quantum state in
S(GPQ). We denote S(P | Q)ρ := S(φPQ) − S(φQ).
Here φQ = trP(φ
PQ).
For quantum states ρ and σ ∈ S(G), we denote the fi-
delity of ρ and σ by
F (ρ, σ) := ‖√ρ√σ‖21 ,
where ‖ · ‖1 stands for the trace norm.
We denote the identity operator on a space G by IG
and the identity superoperator on G by idG.
Let A be a finite set and let G and G′ be a finite-
dimensional complex Hilbert spaces. For a quantum state
ρ ∈ S(G) and a quantum channel V : S(G) → S(G′) the
coherent information is defined as
IC(ρ, V ) := S(V (ρ))− S ((IG ⊗ V )(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) ,
where |ψ〉〈ψ| is an arbitrary purification of ρ in S(G) ⊗
S(G). Let Φ := {ρx : x ∈ A} be a set of quantum states
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labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution
P on A the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
χ(P ; Φ) := S
(∑
x∈A
P (x)ρx
)
−
∑
x∈A
P (x)S (ρx) .
Let n ∈ N, let A be a finite set, and G be a finite-
dimensional complex Hilbert space. For ρ ∈ S(G) and
α > 0 there exists an orthogonal subspace projector Πρ,α
commuting with ρn and satisfying
tr (ρnΠρ,α) ≥ 1− d
4nα2
, (1)
tr (Πρ,α) ≤ 2nS(ρ)+Kdα
√
n , (2)
Πρ,α · ρn ·Πρ,α ≤ 2−nS(ρ)+Kdα
√
nΠρ,α , (3)
where d := dimH , and K is a positive constant.
Let V: A→ S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For
P ∈ P (A), α > 0 and xn ∈ An there exists an or-
thogonal subspace projector ΠV,α(x
n) commuting with
V
⊗n(xn) and satisfying
tr
(
V
⊗n(xn)ΠV,α(xn)
) ≥ 1− ad
4nα2
, (4)
tr (ΠV,α(x
n)) ≤ 2nS(V|P )+Kadα
√
n , (5)
ΠV,α(x
n) · V⊗n(xn) · ΠV,α(xn)
≤ 2−nS(V|P )+Kadα
√
nΠV,α(x
n) , (6)
where a := |{A}|, and K is a positive constant (cf. [40]).
For the classical-quantum channel V : A→ S(G), every
probability distribution P on A defines a quantum state
PV on S(G), which is the resulting quantum state at
the output of V when the input is sent according to P .
Thus for α′ > 0 we can define an orthogonal subspace
projector ΠPV,α′
√
a which fulfills (1), (2), and (3) (here we
set ρ = PV and α = α′
√
a). Furthermore, for ΠPV,α′
√
a
we have the following inequality:
tr
(
V
⊗n(xn) ·ΠPV,α√a
) ≥ 1− ad
4nα2
. (7)
Let A, B, and C be finite sets, H , H ′, and H ′′ be
complex Hilbert spaces, and P and Q be quantum sys-
tems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by HP
and HQ, respectively. Let θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set.
For every t ∈ θ let
Wt be a classical channel A→ P (B);
Vt be a classical channel A→ P (C);
Vt be a classical-quantum channel A→ S(H);
Wt be a quantum channel S(H ′)→ S(H ′′);
Vt be a quantum channel S(H ′)→ S(H);
Nt be a quantum channel S(HP)→ S(HQ).
We call the set of the classical channel pairs (Wt,Vt)t∈θ
a (classical) compound wiretap channel. When the
channel state is t, and the sender inputs x ∈ A into the
channel, the receiver receives the output y ∈ B with
probability Wt(y|x), while the wiretapper receives the
output z ∈ Z with probability Vt(z|x).
We call the set of the classical channel and classical-
quantum channel pairs (Wt, Vt)t∈θ a compound chan-
nel with quantum wiretapper. When the channel
state is t and the sender inputs x ∈ A into the channel,
the receiver receives the output y ∈ B with probability
Wt(y|x), while the wiretapper receives an output quan-
tum state V⊗nt (x) ∈ S(H).
We call the set of the quantum channel pairs
(Wt, Vt)t∈θ a quantum compound wiretap chan-
nel. When the channel state is t and the sender inputs
a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H ′) into the channel, the re-
ceiver receives an output quantum state Wt(ρ) ∈ S(H ′′),
while the wiretapper receives an output quantum state
Vt(ρ) ∈ S(H).
We call the set of the quantum channel (Nt)t∈θ a
quantum compound channel. When the channel
state is t and the sender inputs a quantum state ρP ∈
S(HP) into the channel, the receiver receives an output
quantum state Nt(ρ
P) ∈ S(HQ).
We distinguish two different scenarios according to the
sender’s knowledge of the channel state:
• the sender has the CSI, i.e. he knows which t the
channel state actually is,
• the sender does not have any CSI.
In both cases we assume that the receiver does not have
any CSI, but the wiretapper always has the full knowl-
edge of the CSI. Of course we also have the case where
both the sender and the receiver have the CSI, but this
case is equivalent to the case when we only have one pair
of channels (Wt, Vt), instead of a family of pairs of chan-
nels {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, . . . , T }.
An (n, Jn) code for the classical compound wiretap
channel (Wt,Vt)t∈θ consists of a stochastic encoder E :
{1, . . . , Jn} → P (An) specified by a matrix of conditional
probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of mutually disjoint
sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} (decoding sets).
If the sender has the CSI, then instead of using a sin-
gle code for all channel states, we may use the following
strategy. For every t ∈ θ, the sender and the receiver
build an (n, Jn) code (Et, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) such
that all codes in
{
(Et, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) : t ∈ θ
}
share the same decoding sets {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}, which
do not depend on t, to transform the message.
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate
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for the classical compound wiretap channel (Wt,Vt) hav-
ing CSI at the encoder, if for every positive ε, δ, every
t ∈ θ, and a sufficiently large n there is an (n, Jn) code
(Et, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}), such that 1n log Jn ≥ R − δ,
and
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) ≤ ε , (8)
max
t∈θ
I(Xuni;K
n
t ) ≤ ε , (9)
where Xuni is a random variable uniformly distributed
on {1, . . . , Jn}. Knt are the resulting random variables at
the output of wiretap channels Vnt . Here we denote the
complement of a set Ξ by Ξc.
Remark 2 A weaker and widely used security crite-
rion, e.g. in [28] (also cf. [42] for wiretap channel’s
security criterion), is obtained if we replace (9) with
maxt∈θ 1nI(Xuni;K
n
t ) ≤ ε . In this paper we will follow
[13] and use (9).
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy
rate for the classical compound wiretap channel (Wt,Vt)
having no CSI at the encoder, if for every positive ε,
δ and a sufficiently large n there is an (n, Jn) code
(E, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) such that 1n log Jn ≥ R − δ,
and
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) ≤ ε , (10)
max
t∈θ
I(Xuni;K
n
t ) ≤ ε . (11)
An (n, Jn) code for the compound channel with quan-
tum wiretapper (Wt, Vt)t∈θ consists of a stochastic en-
coder E : {1, . . . , Jn} → P (An) and a collection of mutu-
ally disjoint sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} (decoding
sets).
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy
rate for the compound channel with quantum wiretap-
per (Wt, Vt)t∈θ having CSI at the encoder, if for every
positive ε, δ, every t ∈ θ, and a sufficiently large n, there
is an (n, Jn) code (Et, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) such that
1
n log Jn ≥ R− δ, and
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) ≤ ε , (12)
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ ε . (13)
Here Znt are the resulting quantum states at the output
of wiretap channels Vnt .
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy
rate for the compound channel with quantum wiretap-
per (Wt, Vt)t∈θ having no CSI at the encoder, if for every
positive ε, δ and a sufficiently large n, there is an (n, Jn)
code (E, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) such that 1n log Jn ≥ R−δ,
and
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) ≤ ε , (14)
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ ε . (15)
An (n, Jn) code carrying classical information for the
compound quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ consists
of a family of quantum states {w(j) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} ⊂
S(H ′⊗n) and a collection of positive semi-definite oper-
ators {Dj : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} on S(H ′′⊗n) which is a par-
tition of the identity, i.e.
∑Jn
j=1Dj = IH′′⊗n .
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate
with classical input for the compound quantum wiretap
channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ having CSI at the encoder with av-
erage error, if for every positive ε, δ, every t ∈ θ, and
a sufficiently large n, there is an (n, Jn) code carrying
classical information ({wt(j) : j}, {Dj : j}) such that
1
n log Jn ≥ R− δ, and
max
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
(IH′′⊗n −Dj)W⊗nt (wt(j))
) ≤ ε , (16)
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ ε . (17)
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate
with classical input for the compound quantum wiretap
channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ having no CSI at the encoder, if for
every positive ε and δ, and a sufficiently large n, there
is an (n, Jn) code carrying classical information ({w(j) :
j}, {Dj : j}) such that 1n log Jn ≥ R− δ, and
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
tr
(
(IH′′⊗n −Dj)W⊗nt (w(j))
) ≤ ε ,
(18)
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ ε . (19)
Instead of “achievable secrecy rate with classical input
for the compound quantum wiretap channel ”, we say R
is an achievable secrecy rate for the compound classical-
quantum wiretap channel (Wt, Vt)t∈θ.
An (n, Jn) code carrying quantum information for
the compound quantum channel
(
N⊗nt
)
t∈θ consists of a
Hilbert spaces HA such that dimHA = Jn, and a gen-
eral decoding quantum operation D, i.e., a completely
positive, trace-preserving map D : S(HQn) → S(HM),
where HM is a Hilbert space such that dimHM = Jn.
The code can be used for entanglement generation in
the following way. The sender prepares a pure bipar-
tite quantum state |ψ〉APn , defined on HA ⊗HPn , and
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sends thePn portion of it through the channel N⊗nt . The
receiver performs the general decoding quantum opera-
tion on the channel output D : S(HQn)→ S(HM). The
sender and the receiver share the resulting quantum state
ΩAMt := [I
A ⊗ (D ◦N⊗nt )]
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|APn
)
. (20)
A non-negative number R is an achievable entangle-
ment generating rate for the compound quantum channel(
N⊗nt
)
t∈θ if for every positive ε, δ, and a sufficiently large
n, there is an (n, Jn) code carrying quantum information(
HA, D
)
such that 1n log Jn ≥ R− δ, and
min
t∈θ
F
(
ΩAMt , |ΦK〉〈ΦK |AM
) ≥ 1− ε , (21)
where
|ΦK〉AM :=
√
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A|j〉M ,
which is the standard maximally entangled state shared
by the sender and the receiver. {|j〉A} and {|j〉M} are
orthonormal bases for HA and HM, respectively.
The largest achievable secrecy rate is called the secrecy
capacity. The largest achievable entanglement generating
rate is called the entanglement generating capacity.
III. CLASSICAL COMPOUND WIRETAP
CHANNELS
In this section, we present some known results for the
classical compound wiretap channel which are used for
the proof of the results in Section IV.
Let A, B, C, θ, and (Wt,Vt)t∈θ be defined as in Sec-
tion II. For every t ∈ θ, we fix a probability distribution
pt on A
n. Let p′t(x
n) :=
{
pnt (x
n)
pnt (T npt,δ)
, if xn ∈ T npt,δ
0 , else
and X(t) := {X(t)j,l }j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln,t} be a family of
random matrices whose entries are selected i.i.d. accord-
ing to p′t, where Ln,t is a natural number, which will be
specified later.
It was shown in [13] that for any positive ω, if we set
Jn = ⌊2n(mint∈θ(I(pt;Wt)− 1n logLn,t−µ)⌋ ,
where µ is a positive constant which does not depend on
j, t, and can be arbitrarily small when ω goes to 0, the
following statement is valid. There are such {Dj : j =
1, . . . , Jn} that for all t ∈ θ and for all Ln,t ∈ N
Pr

 max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
W
n
t (D
c
j |X(t)j,l ) >
√
T2−nω/2


≤
√
T2−nω/2 . (22)
Since only the error of the legitimate receiver is analyzed,
for the result (22) just the channels Wt, but not those of
the wiretapper, are regarded. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn},
l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln,t}, and t ∈ θ, Wnt (Dcj |X(t)j,l ) is a random
variable taking values in ]0, 1[, which depends on X
(t)
j,l ,
since we defined X
(t)
j,l as a random variable with value in
An.
In view of (22), by choosing Ln,t =
⌊
2n[I(pt;Vt)+τ ]
⌋
, for
any positive constant τ , the authors of [13] showed that
CS,CSI , the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap
channel with CSI at the transmitter is given by
CS,CSI ≥ min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BK)t
(I(U ;Bt)− I(U ;Kt)) , (23)
where Bt are the resulting random variables at the out-
put of legal receiver channels. Kt are the resulting ran-
dom variables at the output of wiretap channels. The
maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy
the Markov chain relationships: U → A → (BZ)t. Here
A → (BZ)t means A → Bt × Zt, where A → Bt means
A
Wt−−→ Bt and A→ Zt means A Vt−→ Zt.
Bjelakovic, Boche and Sommerfeld also proved in [13]
CS,CSI ≥ min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BK)t
(I(U ;Bt)− I(U ;Kt)) .
Together with this inequality and (23) we have
CS,CSI = min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BK)t
(I(U ;Bt)− I(U ;Kt)) . (24)
Analogously, in the case without CSI, the idea is simi-
lar to the case with CSI: Fix a probability distribution p
on An. Let p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(T n
p,δ
) if x
n ∈ T np,δ
0 else
andXn := {Xj,l}j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln}, where Ln, a natu-
ral number, will be specified later, be a family of random
matrices whose components are selected i.i.d. according
to p′.
For any ω > 0, we define
Jn = ⌊2n(mint∈θ(I(p;Wt)− 1n logLn−µ)⌋ ,
where µ is a positive constant which does not depend on
j and t, and can be arbitrarily small when ω goes to 0.
There are {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn} such that for all t ∈ θ and
for all Ln ∈ N
Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
W
n
t (D
c
j |Xj,l) >
√
T 2−nω/2
)
≤
√
T2−nω/2 . (25)
In view of (25), by choosing Ln =
⌊
2n[maxt I(pt;Vt)+
τ
4 ]
⌋
,
where τ is a positive constant, the authors of [13] showed
that CS , the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap
channel without CSI at the transmitter, is lower bounded
as follows:
CS ≥ maxU→A→(BK)t(mint∈θ I(U ;Bt)−maxt∈θ I(U ;Kt)) . (26)
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IV. COMPOUND CHANNELS WITH
QUANTUM WIRETAPPER
In this section we discuss the classical compound chan-
nel with a quantum wiretapper. For the case when the
sender has the full knowledge about the CSI, we derive
the secrecy capacity. For the case when the sender does
not know the CSI, we give a lower bound for the se-
crecy capacity. In this channel model, the wiretapper
uses classical-quantum channels.
Let A, B, H , θ, and (Wt, Vt)t∈θ be defined as in Section
II.
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity of the compound chan-
nel with quantum wiretapper (Wt, Vt)t∈θ in the case with
CSI at the transmitter CS,CSI is given by
CS,CSI = min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BZ)t
(I(U ;Bt)−lim sup
n→∞
1
n
χ(U ;Znt )) .
(27)
Respectively, in the case without CSI, the secrecy capac-
ity of the compound channel with quantum wiretapper
(Wt, Vt)t∈θ CS is lower bounded as follows
CS ≥ maxU→A→(BZ)t(mint∈θ I(U ;Bt)−maxt χ(U ;Zt)) , (28)
where Bt are the resulting random variables at the output
of legal receiver channels, and Zt are the resulting ran-
dom quantum states at the output of wiretap channels.
Remark 3 We have only the multi-letter formulas (27)
and (28), since we do not have a single-letter formula
even for a quantum channel which is neither compound
nor has wiretappers.
Proof. 1) Lower bound for case with CSI
For every t ∈ θ, fix a probability distribution pt on An.
Let
Jn = ⌊2n(mint∈θ(I(pt;Wt)− 1n logLn,t−µ)⌋ ,
where Ln,t is a natural number that will be specified
below, and µ is defined as in Section III. Let p′t, X
(t),
and Dj be defined as in the classical case. Then (22)
still holds, since the sender transmits through a classical
channel to the legitimate receiver.
Let
Qt(x
n) := ΠptVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)·V⊗nt (xn)·ΠVt,α(xn)ΠptVt,α√a ,
where α will be defined later.
Lemma 1 (Tender Operator, cf. [41] and [32])
Let ρ be a quantum state and X be a positive operator
with X ≤ I and 1− tr(ρX) ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then
‖ρ−
√
Xρ
√
X‖ ≤
√
2λ . (29)
Tender Operator was first introduced in [41], where it
has been shown that ‖ρ − √Xρ√X‖ ≤ √8λ. In [32],
the result of [41] has been improved, and (29) has been
proved.
In view of the fact that ΠptVt,α
√
a and ΠVt,α(x
n) are
both projection matrices, by (1), (7), and Lemma 1 for
any t and xn, it holds that
‖Qt(xn)− V⊗nt (xn)‖ ≤
√
2(ad+ d)
nα2
. (30)
We set Θt :=
∑
xn∈T n
pt,δ
p′nt (x
n)Qt(x
n). For given zn
and t, 〈zn|Θt|zn〉 is the expected value of 〈zn|Qt(xn)|zn〉
under the condition xn ∈ T npt,δ.
Lemma 2 (Covering Lemma, cf. [3]) Let V be a fi-
nite dimensional Hilbert space. Let E ⊂ S(V) be a col-
lection of density operators such that σ ≤ µ · IV for all
σ ∈ E, and let p be a probability distribution on on E.
For any positive λ, we define a sequence of i.i.d. ran-
dom variables X1, . . . , XL, taking values in E such that
for all σ ∈ E we have p(σ) = Pr
{
Xi = Π
′
ρ,λ · σ ·Π′ρ,λ
}
,
where ρ :=
∑
σ∈E p(σ)σ, and Π
′
ρ,λ is the projector onto
the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of ρ whose cor-
responding eigenvalues are greater than λdimV . For any
ǫ ∈]0, 1[, the following inequality holds
Pr
(
‖L−1
L∑
i=1
Xi −Π′ρ,λ · ρ · Π′ρ,λ‖ > ǫ
)
≤ 2 · (dimV)exp
(
−L ǫ
2λ
2 ln2(dimV)µ
)
. (31)
Let V be the range space of ΠptVt,α√a. By (2) we have
dimV ≤ 2nS(pt)+Kdα
√
an .
Furthermore, for all xn holds
Qt(x
n)
= ΠptVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n) · V⊗nt (xn) ·ΠVt,α(xn)ΠptVt,α√a
≤ 2−n(S(Vt|pt)+Kadα
√
n)ΠptVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)ΠptVt,α
√
a
≤ 2−n·S(Vt|pt)+Kadα
√
n · ΠptVt,α√a
≤ 2−n·S(Vt|pt)+Kadα
√
n · IV . (32)
The first inequality follows from (6). The second inequal-
ity holds because ΠVt,α and ΠptVt,α
√
a are projection ma-
trices. The third inequality holds because ΠptVt,α
√
a is a
projection matrix onto V .
Let λ = ǫ. By applying Lemma 2, where we set µ :=
2−n·S(Vt|pt)+Kadα
√
n in (31) in view of (32), if n is large
enough we have
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(Xj,l)−Θt‖ > ǫ


7
≤ 2n(S(pt)+Kdα
√
an) (33)
· exp
(
−Ln,t ǫ
2
2 ln 2
λ · 2n(S(Vt|pt)−S(pt))+Kdα
√
n(
√
a−1)
)
= 2n(S(pt)+Kdα
√
an)
· exp
(
−Ln,t ǫ
2
2 ln 2
λ · 2n(−χ(pt;Zt))+Kdα
√
n(
√
a−1)
)
≤ exp
(
−Ln,t · 2−n(χ(pt;Zt)+ζ)
)
, (34)
where ζ is some suitable positive constant which does
not depend on j, t, and can be arbitrarily small when ǫ
is close to 0. The equality in the last line holds since
S(pt)− S(Vt|pt)
= S

∑
j
pt(j)
∑
l
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (X
(t)
j,l )


−
∑
j
pt(j)S
(∑
l
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (X
(t)
j,l )
)
= χ(pt;Zt) .
Let Ln,t = ⌈2n(χ(pt;Zt)+2ζ)⌉, and n be large enough,
then by (34) for all j it holds that
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ

 ≤ exp(−2nζ) (35)
and
Pr

‖Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀t ∀j


= 1− Pr

⋃
t
⋃
j
{‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ > ǫ}


≥ 1− TJnexp(−2nζ)
≥ 1− T 2n(mint∈θ(I(pt;Wt)− 1n logLn,t)exp(−2nζ)
≥ 1− 2−nυ , (36)
where υ is some suitable positive constant which does not
depend on j and t.
Remark 4 Since exp(−2nζ) converges to zero double ex-
ponentially quickly, the inequality (36) remains true even
if T depends on n and is exponentially large over n, i.e.,
we can still achieve an exponentially small error.
From (22) and (36) it follows: For any ǫ > 0, if n is
large enough then the event
⋂
t

 maxj∈{1,...,Jn}
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
W
n
t (D
c
j(X )|X(t)j,l ) ≤ ǫ




∩



‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀t ∀j




has a positive probability. This means that we can find
a realization x
(t)
j,l of X
(t)
j,l with a positive probability such
that for all t ∈ θ and j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, we have
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
W
n
t (D
c
j |x(t)j,l ) ≤ ǫ , (37)
and
‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ . (38)
For an arbitrary γ > 0 let
R := min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BZ)t
(I(U ;Bt)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
χ(U ;Znt ))−γ .
Choose µ < 12γ, then for every t ∈ θ, there is an (n, Jn)
code
(
(x
(t)
j,l )j=1,...,Jn,l=1,...,Ln,t , {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}
)
such that
1
n
log Jn ≥ R , (39)
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
W
n
t (D
c
j |x(t)j,l ) = 0 . (40)
Choose a suitable α in (30) such that for all j, it
holds ‖V⊗nt (x(t)j,l ) − Qt(x(t)j,l )‖ < ǫ . For any given j′ ∈
{1, . . . , Jn}, (30) and (38) yield
‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤ ‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j′,l)−
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)‖
+ ‖
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
‖V⊗nt (x(t)j′,l)−Qt(x(t)j′,l)‖
+ ‖
L
(t)
n,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
Qt(x
(t)
j′,l)−Θt‖
≤ 2ǫ , (41)
and ‖∑Jnj=1 1Jn ∑Ln,tl=1 1Ln,tV⊗nt (x(t)j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ.
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Lemma 3 (Fannes-Audenaert Ineq., cf. [22], [4])
Let Φ and Ψ be two quantum states in a d-dimensional
complex Hilbert space and ‖Φ−Ψ‖ ≤ µ < 1e , then
|S(Φ)−S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log(d−1)−µ log µ−(1−µ) log(1−µ) .
(42)
The Fannes Inequality was first introduced in [22],
where it has been shown that |S(X)− S(Y)| ≤ µ log d−
µ logµ. In [4] the result of [22] has been improved, and
(42) has been proved.
By Lemma 3 and the inequality (41), for a uniformly
distributed distributed random variable Xuni with value
in {1, . . . , Jn}, we have
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t )
= S

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j,l )


−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j,l )


≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣S

 Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j,l )

− S (Θt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣S(Θt)−
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn
S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j,l )


∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫ log(d− 1)− ǫ log ǫ − (1− ǫ) log(1− ǫ)
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Jn∑
j=1
1
Jn

S(Θt)− S

Ln,t∑
l=1
1
Ln,t
V
⊗n
t (x
(t)
j,l )




∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 3ǫ log(d− 1)− ǫ log ǫ− (1− ǫ) log(1 − ǫ)− 2ǫ log 2ǫ .
(43)
By (43), for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, we
have
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ λ . (44)
For every t ∈ θ we define an (n, Jn) code
(Et, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}), where Et is built such that
Pr
(
Et(j) = x
(t)
j,l
)
= 1Ln,t for l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln,t}. Combin-
ing (40) and (44) we obtain
CS,CSI ≥ min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BZ)t
(I(U ;Bt)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
χ(U ;Znt )) .
(45)
Thus, we have shown the “≥” part of (27).
2) Upper bound for case with CSI
Let (Cn) be a sequence of (n, Jn) codes such that
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnt (Dcj |xn) =: ǫ1,n , (46)
max
t∈θ
χ(J ;Znt ) =: ǫ2,n , (47)
where limn→∞ ǫ1,n = 0 and limn→∞ ǫ2,n = 0. J denotes
the random variable which is uniformly distributed on
the message set {1, . . . , Jn}.
We denote the security capacity of the wiretap channel
(Wt, Vt) in the sense of [40] by C(Wt, Vt). Choose t
′ ∈ θ
such that C(Wt′ , Vt′) = mint∈θ C(Wt, Vt).
We denote a new random variable by Xˆ with values
in {1, . . . , Jn} determined by the Markov chain Xuni →
A → Bt′ → Xˆ, where the first transition is governed by
the sender’s encoding strategy, the second by Wt′ , and
the last by the legal receiver’s decoding strategy. Then
we have from the data processing inequality
log Jn = H(Xuni)
= I(Xuni, Xˆ) +H(Xuni | Xˆ)
≤ I(Xuni, Bnt′) +H(Xuni | Xˆ) .
Using Fano’s inequality we have
H(Xuni | Xˆ) ≤ 1 + ǫ1,n log Jn .
Thus log Jn ≤ I(Xuni, Bnt′)+1+ǫ1,n log Jn. Applying the
standard technique for single letter formula in classical
information theory we have
log Jn ≤ nI(Xuni, Bt′) + 1 + ǫ1,n log Jn . (48)
Thus for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large 1n log Jn
can not be greater than
I(Xuni;Bt′) +
1
n
+
1
n
ǫ1,n log Jn
≤ [I(Xuni;Bt′)− 1
n
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t′)] +
ǫ1,n
n
+
1
n
log Jn +
ǫ2,n
n
≤ [I(Xuni;Bt′)− 1
n
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t′)] + ǫ . (49)
We can not exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst
wiretap channel, since we have to guarantee that the legal
receiver can decode the message in the worst case (cf.
(13) and Section I). Thus, we have
CS,CSI ≤ min
t∈θ
max
U→A→(BZ)t
(I(U ;Bt)−lim sup
n→∞
1
n
χ(U ;Znt )) .
(50)
Combining (50) and (45) we obtain (27).
3) Lower bound for case without CSI
Fix a probability distribution p on An. Let
Jn = ⌊2mint∈θ(nI(p;Wt)−logLn)−nµ⌋ ,
where Ln is a natural defined as in Section III. Let p
′,
Xn, and Dj (25) still holds.
For a positive α, we define
Qt(x
n) := ΠpVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)·V⊗nt (xn)·ΠVt,α(xn)ΠpVt,α√a
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and Θt :=
∑
xn∈T n
p,δ
p′n(xn)Qt(xn).
For any positive δ let Ln = ⌈2nmaxt(χ(p;Zt)+δ)⌉ and n
be large enough, in the same way as our proof of (36)
for the case with CSI at the encoder, there is a positive
constant υ so that
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(X
(t)
j,l )−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀t ∀j
)
≥ 1− 2−nυ .
(51)
For any positive ǫ we choose a suitable α, by (25) and
(51) there is a realization xj,l of Xj,l with a positive prob-
ability such that: For all t ∈ θ and all j ∈ {1, . . . Jn}, we
have
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
W
n
t (D
c
j |xj,l) ≤ ǫ ,
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(xj,l)−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ .
For any γ > 0 let
R := max
U→A→(BZ)t
(
min
t∈θ
I(U ;Bt)−max
t
χ(U ;Zt)
)
− γ .
Then there is an (n, Jn) code (E, {Dj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}),
where E is so built that Pr (E(j) = xj,l) =
1
Ln,t
for l ∈
{1, . . . , Ln,t}, such that lim infn→∞ 1n log Jn ≥ R, and
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
W
n
t (D
c
j |xj,l)) = 0 . (52)
In the same way as our proof of (44) for the case with
CSI at the encoder,
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ ǫ , (53)
for any uniformly distributed distributed random vari-
able Xuni with value in {1, . . . , Jn}.
Combining (52) and (53) we obtain
CS ≥ maxU→A→(BZ)t(mint∈θ I(U ;Bt)−maxt∈θ χ(U ;Zt)) .
V. COMPOUND CLASSICAL-QUANTUM
WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we derive the secrecy capacity of the
compound classical-quantum wiretap channel with CSI.
In this model, both the receiver and the wiretapper use
classical quantum channels and the set of the channel
states may be finite or infinite.
Let A, H , H ′, H ′′, θ, and (Wt, Vt)t∈θ be defined as in
Section II.
Theorem 2 The secrecy capacity of the compound
classical-quantum wiretap channel in the case with CSI
is given by
CCSI = lim
n→∞
min
t∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt ))
(54)
where Bt are the resulting random quantum states at the
output of legal receiver channels and Zt are the resulting
random quantum states at the output of wiretap channels.
The maximum is taken over all probability distributions
Pinp on the input quantum states wt.
Assume that the sender’s encoding is restricted to
transmitting an indexed finite set of orthogonal quantum
states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(H ′⊗n), then the secrecy capac-
ity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel in
the case with no CSI at the encoder is given by
CS = lim
n→∞ maxU→A→(BZ)t
1
n
(
min
t∈θ
χ(U ;Bnt )
−max
t∈θ
χ(U ;Znt )
)
. (55)
Proof. At first we are going to prove (54). Our idea is
to send the information in two parts. First, we send the
channel state information with finite blocks of finite bits
with a code C1 to the receiver, and then, depending on t,
we send the message with a code C
(t)
2 in the second part.
1.1) Sending channel state information with finite bits
We do not require that the first part should be secure
against the wiretapper, since we assume that the wire-
tapper already has the full knowledge of the CSI.
By ignoring the security against the wiretapper, we
consider only the compound channel (Wt)t∈θ. Let W =
(Wt)t be an arbitrary compound-classical quantum chan-
nel. Then, by [9], for each λ ∈ (0, 1), the λ capacity
C(W,λ) equals
C(W,λ) = max
Pinp∈P (A)
min
t
χ(Pinp;Wt) . (56)
If maxPinp mint χ(Pinp;Wt) > 0 holds, then the sender
can build a code C1 such that the CSI can be sent
to the legal receiver with a block with length l ≤
log T
mint maxPinp χ(Pinp,Wt)
− ǫ. If maxPinp mint χ(Pinp;Wt) =
0 holds, we can not build a code C1 such that the CSI
can be sent to the legal receiver. But, this does not cause
any problem, since if maxPinp mint χ(Pinp;Wt) = 0, the
right-hand side of (54) is zero.
1.2) Message transformation when both the sender and
the legal receiver know CSI
If both the sender and the legal receiver have the full
knowledge of t, then we only have to look at the single
wiretap channel (Wt, Vt).
In [19] and [20] it was shown that if n is sufficiently
large, there exists an (n, Jn) code for the quantum wire-
tap channel (W,V ) with
log Jn = max
Pinp,w
(χ(Pinp;B
n)− χ(Pinp;Zn))− ǫ , (57)
10
for any positive ǫ and positive δ, where B is the resulting
random variable at the output of legal receiver’s channel
and Z the output of the wiretap channel.
When the sender and the legal receiver both know t,
they can build an (n, Jn,t) code C
(t)
2 where
log Jn,t = max
Pinp,wt
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt ))− ǫ . (58)
Thus,
CCSI ≥ lim
n→∞mint∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt )) .
(59)
Remark 5 For the construction of the second part of our
code, we use random coding and request that the random-
ization can be sent (cf. [19]). However, it was shown
in [13] that the randomization could not always be sent
if we require that we use one unique code which is se-
cure against the wiretapper and suitable for every chan-
nel state, i.e., it does not depend on t. This is not a
counterexample to our results above, neither to the con-
struction of C1 nor to the construction of C
(t)
2 , because
of the following facts.
The first part of our code does not need to be
secure. For our second part, the legal transmitters
can use the following strategy: At first they build
a code C1 = (E, {Dt : t = 1, . . . , |θ|}) and a code
C
(t)
2 = (E
(t), {D(t)j : j = 1, . . . , Jn}) for every t ∈ θ.
If the sender wants to send the CSI t′ ∈ θ and the
message j, he encodes t′ with E and j with E(t
′),
then he sends both parts together through the channel.
After receiving both parts, the legal receiver decodes
the first part with {Dt : t}, and chooses the right
decoders {D(t′)j : j} ∈
{
{D(t)j : j} : t ∈ θ
}
to decode the
second part. With this strategy, we can avoid using
one unique code which is suitable for every channel state.
1.3) Upper bound for the case CSI at the encoder
For any ǫ > 0, we choose t′ ∈ θ such that C(Wt′ , Vt′) ≤
inft∈θ C(Wt, Vt) + ǫ.
From [19] and [20] we know that the secrecy capacity
of the quantum wiretap channel (Wt′ , Vt′) can not be
greater than
lim
n→∞
max
Pinp,wt′
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t′)− χ(Pinp;Znt′)) .
Since we can not exceed the capacity of the worst wiretap
channel, we have
CCSI ≤ lim
n→∞mint∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt )).
(60)
This together with (59) completes the proof of (54).
Remark 6 In [39] it was shown that if for a given t and
any n ∈ N,
χ(Pinp;B
n
t ) ≥ χ(Pinp;Znt )
holds for all Pinp ∈ P (A) and {wt(j) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} ⊂
S(H⊗n), then
lim
n→∞
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt ))
= max
Pinp,wt
(χ(Pinp;Bt)− χ(Pinp;Zt)) .
Thus if for every t ∈ θ and n ∈ N,
I(Pinp, B
n
t ) ≥ I(Pinp;Znt )
holds for all Pinp ∈ P (A) and {wt(j) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} ⊂
S(H⊗n), we have
CCSI = min
t∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
(χ(Pinp;Bt)− χ(Pinp;Zt)) .
Now we are going to prove (55).
2.1) Lower bound for case without CSI
Fix a probability distribution p on An. Let
Jn = ⌊2mint∈θ χ(p;B
n
t )−maxt∈θ χ(p;Znt )−2nµ⌋ ,
Ln = ⌈2maxt χ(p;Z
n
t )+nµ⌉ ,
and let p′ and Xn = {Xj,l : j, l} be defined as in
the classical case (cf. Section III). Since Jn · Ln ≤
2mint χ(p;B
n
t )−nµ, in [18] it was shown that if n is suffi-
ciently large, there exist a collection of quantum states
{ρxn : xn ∈ An} ⊂ S(H ′⊗n), a collection of positive-
semidefinite operators {Dt,xn : t ∈ θ, xn ∈ An}, and
a positive constant β, such that for any (t, j, l) ∈ θ ×
{1, . . . , Jn} × {1, . . . , Ln} it holds
Pr
[
tr
(
Wnt (ρ
n
Xj,l
)Dt,Xj,l
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ
]
> 1− 2−nβ ,
(61)
and for any realization {xj,l : j, l} of {Xj,l : j, l} it holds
that
∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
Dt,xj,l ≤ I .
We define
Qt(ρxn) := ΠpVt,α
√
aΠVt,α(x
n)·V ⊗nt (ρxn)·ΠVt,α(xn)ΠpVt,α√a ,
and Θt :=
∑
xn∈T n
p,δ
p′n(xn)Qt(ρxn).
Choosing n sufficiently large, in the same way as our
proof of (36) for the classical compound channel with
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quantum wiretapper, there is a positive constant υ such
that
Pr
(
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(ρX(t)
j,l
)− Θt‖ ≤ ǫ ∀t ∀j
)
≥ 1− 2−nυ .
(62)
We choose a suitable α. If n is sufficiently large, we can
find a realization xj,l of Xj,l with a positive probability
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . Jn}, we have
min
t∈θ
tr
(
Wnt (ρ
n
xj,l
)Dt,xj,l
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ
and
max
t∈θ
‖
Ln∑
l=1
1
Ln
Qt(ρxj,l)−Θt‖ ≤ ǫ .
We define Dj :=
∑
t∈θ
∑Ln
l=1Dt,xj,l , then
∑Jn
j=1Dj =∑
t∈θ
∑Jn
j=1
∑Ln
l=1Dt,xj,l ≤ I. Furthermore, for all t′ ∈ θ
and l′ ∈ {1, . . . , Ln} we have
tr
(
Wnt′ (ρ
n
xj,l′
)Dj
)
=
∑
t∈θ
Ln∑
l=1
tr
(
Wnt′ (ρ
n
xj,l′
)Dt,xj,l
)
≥ tr
(
Wnt′ (ρ
⊗n
xj,l′
)Dt′,xj,l′
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ ,
the inequality in the third line holds because for two pos-
itive semi-definite matrices M1 and M2, we always have
tr (M1M2) = tr
(√
M1M2
√
M1
) ≥ 0.
For any γ > 0 let
R := max
U→A→(BZ)t
1
n
[
min
t∈θ
χ(p;Bnt )−max
t∈θ
χ(p;Znt )
]
− γ .
Then for any positive λ, there is an (n, Jn, λ) code(
{w(j) := ∑Lnl=1 1Ln ρnxj,l : j = 1, . . . , Jn, }, {Dj : j =
1, . . . , Jn}
)
, such that lim infn→∞ 1n log Jn ≥ R,
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
tr
(
(IH′′⊗n −Dj)W⊗nt (w(j))
) ≤ λ ,
(63)
and in the same way as our proof of (44) for the classical
compound channel with quantum wiretapper,
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) ≤ λ , (64)
for any uniformly distributed random variable Xuni with
value in {1, . . . , Jn}.
Combining (63) and (64) we obtain
CS ≥ lim
n→∞
max
U→A→(BZ)t
1
n
(
min
t∈θ
χ(U ;Bnt )−max
t∈θ
χ(U ;Znt )
)
.
(65)
2.2) Upper bound for case without CSI
Let (Cn) = ({ρ(n)j : j}, {D(n)j : j}) be a sequence of
(n, Jn, λn) code such that
max
t∈θ
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
tr
(
(I−D(n)j )W⊗nt
(
ρ
(n)
j
))
≤ λn , (66)
max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) =: ǫ2,n , (67)
where limn→∞ λn = 0 and limn→∞ ǫ2,n = 0. Xuni de-
notes the random variable which is uniformly distributed
on the message set {1, . . . , Jn}.
We denote the classical capacity of the quantum chan-
nel Wt in the sense of [40] by C(Wt). Choose t
′ ∈ θ such
that C(Wt′) = mint∈θ C(Wt).
It is known (cf. Section IV 2) Upper bound for case
with CSI and [31]) that can not exceed χ(Xuni;B
n
t′) + ξ
for any constant ξ > 0. Since the secrecy capacity of a
compound wiretap channel can not exceed the capacity
of the worst channel without wiretapper, for any ǫ > 0
choose ξ = 12ǫ, if n is large enough, the secrecy rate of
(Cn) can not be greater than
1
n
χ(Xuni;B
n
t′) + ξ
= min
t∈θ
1
n
χ(Xuni;B
n
t ) + ξ
≤ min
t∈θ
1
n
χ(Xuni;B
n
t )−max
t∈θ
1
n
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t ) + ξ +
1
n
ǫ2,n
≤ 1
n
(
min
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;B
n
t )−max
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
n
t )
)
+ ǫ . (68)
Thus
CS ≤ lim
n→∞
max
U→A→(BZ)t
1
n
(
min
t∈θ
χ(U ;Bnt )−max
t∈θ
χ(U ;Znt )
)
.
(69)
Combining (69) and (65) we obtain (55).
So far, we assumed that |θ|, the number of the chan-
nels, is finite, therefore we can send the CSI with finite
bits to the receiver in the case where the sender has CSI.
Now we look at the case where |θ| can be arbitrary. We
of course are not allowed to send the CSI with finite bits
if |θ| =∞, but in this case, we may use a “finite approx-
imation” to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For an arbitrary set θ we have
CS,CSI = lim
n→∞
inf
t∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt )) .
(70)
Proof. Let W : S(H ′) → S(H ′′) be a linear map, then
let
‖W‖♦ := sup
n∈N
max
a∈S(Cn⊗H′),‖a‖1=1
‖(In ⊗W )(a)‖1 . (71)
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It is known [33] that this norm is multiplicative, i.e.
‖W ⊗W ′‖♦ = ‖W‖♦ · ‖W ′‖♦.
A τ -net in the space of the completely positive
trace-preserving maps S(H ′) → S(H ′′) is a finite set(
W (k)
)K
k=1
of completely positive trace-preserving maps
S(H ′) → S(H ′′) with the property that for each com-
pletely positive trace-preserving map W : S(H ′) →
S(H ′′), there is at least one k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} with ‖W −
W (k)‖♦ < τ .
Lemma 4 (τ−net [30]) Let H ′ and H ′′ be finite-
dimensional complex Hilbert spaces. For any τ ∈ (0, 1],
there is a τ-net of quantum-channels
(
W (k)
)K
k=1
in the
space of the completely positive trace preserving maps
S(H ′)→ S(H ′′) with K ≤ ( 3τ )2d
′4
, where d′ = dimH ′.
If |θ| is arbitrary, then for any ξ > 0 let τ = ξ− log ξ . By
Lemma 4 there exists a finite set θ′ with |θ′| ≤ ( 3τ )2d
′4
and τ -nets (Wt′)t′∈θ′ , (Vt′ )t′∈θ′ such that for every t ∈ θ
we can find a t′ ∈ θ′ with ‖Wt −Wt′‖♦ ≤ τ and
‖Vt − Vt′‖♦ ≤ τ . For every t′ ∈ θ′, the legal transmitters
build a code C
(t′)
2 = {wt′ , {Dt′,j : j}}. Since by [19], the
error probability of the code C
(t′)
2 decreases exponentially
with its length, there is an N = O(− log ξ) such that for
all t′′ ∈ θ′ it holds
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt′′ (wt′′(j))Dt′′,j
) ≥ 1− λ− ξ , (72)
χ(Xuni;Z
N
t′ ) ≤ ξ . (73)
Then, if the sender obtains the channel state informa-
tion “t” , he chooses a “t′” ∈ θ′ such that ‖Wt −Wt′‖♦ ≤
τ and ‖Vt − Vt′‖♦ ≤ τ . He can send “t′” to the legal re-
ceiver in the first part with finite bits, and then they
build a code C
(t′)
2 that fulfills (72) and (73) to transmit
the message.
For every t′ and j let |ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)| ∈ S(H ′⊗N ⊗
H ′⊗N ) be an arbitrary purification of the quantum
state wt′(j), then tr
[(
W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′
)
(wt′(j))
]
=
tr
(
trH′⊗N
[
I⊗NH′ ⊗ (W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′(j)|)
])
.
We have
tr
∣∣(W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (wt′ (j))∣∣
= tr
(
trH′⊗N
∣∣I⊗NH′ ⊗ (W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)∣∣)
= tr
∣∣I⊗NH′ ⊗ (W⊗nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)∣∣
=
∥∥I⊗NH′ ⊗ (W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′(j)|)∥∥1
≤ ‖W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ‖♦ · ‖(|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|)‖1
≤ Nτ .
The second equality follows from the definition of
trace. The second inequality follows by the definition
of ‖ · ‖♦. The third inequality follows from the facts
that ‖ (|ψt′(j)〉〈ψt′ (j)|) ‖1 = 1 and
∥∥W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ∥∥♦ =∥∥∥(Wt −Wt′)⊗N∥∥∥
♦
= N ·‖Wt −Wt′‖♦, since ‖·‖♦ is mul-
tiplicative.
It follows that∣∣∣∣ 1JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
)
− 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt′ (wt′(j))Dt′,j
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
∣∣tr [(W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (wt′(j))Dt′,j]∣∣
≤ 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
∣∣(W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (wt′(j))Dt′,j∣∣
≤ 1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
∣∣(W⊗Nt −W⊗Nt′ ) (wt′(j))∣∣
≤ 1
JN
JNNτ
= Nτ . (74)
Nτ can be arbitrarily small when ξ is close to zero,
since N = O(− log ξ).
Let Xuni be a random variable uniformly distributed
on {1, . . . , JN}, and {ρ(j) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} be a set of
quantum states labeled by elements of {1, . . . , Jn}. We
have
|χ(Xuni;Vt)− χ(Xuni;Vt′)|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣S

 JN∑
j=1
1
JN
Vt(ρ(j))

 − S

 JN∑
j=1
1
JN
Vt′(ρ(j))


∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
JN∑
j=1
1
JN
S (Vt(ρ(j))) −
JN∑
j=1
1
JN
S (Vt′(ρ(j)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ τ log(d− 1)− τ log τ − (1− τ) log(1− τ) , (75)
where d = dimH . The inequality in the last line holds
by Lemma 3 and because ‖Vt(ρ)− Vt′(ρ)‖ ≤ τ for all
ρ ∈ S(H) when ‖Vt − Vt′‖♦ ≤ τ .
By (74) and (75) we have
sup
t∈θ
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
) ≥ 1− λ− ξ −Nτ ,
χ(Xuni;Z
N
t ) ≤ ξ+τ log(d−1)−τ log τ−(1−τ) log(1−τ) .
Since ξ + Nτ and τ log(d − 1) can be arbitrarily small,
when ξ is close to zero, we have
sup
t∈θ
1
JN
JN∑
j=1
tr
(
W⊗Nt (wt′(j))Dt′,j
) ≥ 1− λ ,
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sup
t∈θ
χ(Xuni;Z
N
t ) ≤ ǫ .
The bits that the sender uses to transform the CSI are
large but constant, so it is still negligible compared to
the second part. We obtain
CCSI ≥ lim
n→∞ inft∈θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
t )− χ(Pinp;Znt )) .
(76)
The proof of the converse is similar to those given in
the proof of Theorem 2, where we consider a worst t′.
Remark 7 In (54) and Corollary 1 we have only re-
quired that the legal receiver can decode the correct mes-
sage with a high probability if n is sufficiently large. We
have not specified how fast the error probability tends to
zero when the code length goes to infinity. If we analyze
the relation between the error probability ε and the code
length, then we have the following facts.
In the case of finite θ, let ε1 denote the error probability
of the first part of the code (i.e. the legal receiver does
not decode the correct CSI), and let ε2 denote the error
probability of the second part of the code (i.e. the legal
receiver decodes the correct CSI, but does not decode the
message). Since the length of the first part of the code is
l · log c · c′ = O(log ε1), we have ε−11 is O(exp(l · log c ·
c′)) = O(exp(n)), where n stands for the length of the
first part of the code. For the second part of the code,
ε2 decreased exponentially with the length of the second
part, as proven in [19]. Thus, the error probability ε =
max{ε1, ε2} decreases exponentially with the code length
in the case of finite θ.
If θ is infinite, let ε1 denote the error probabil-
ity of the first part of the code probability. Here we
have to build two τ-nets for a suitable τ , each con-
tains O((− log ε1ε1 )
−2d′4) channels. If we want to send
the CSI of these τ-nets, the length of first part l will
be O(−2d′4 · log(ε1 log ε1)), which means here ε−11 will
be O(exp( n
4d′4
)) = O(exp(n)). Thus we can still achieve
that the error probability decreases exponentially with the
code length in case of infinite θ.
VI. ENTANGLEMENT GENERATION OVER
COMPOUND QUANTUM CHANNELS
The entanglement generating capacity of a given quan-
tum channel describes the maximal amount of entangle-
ment that we can generate or transmit over the chan-
nel. A code for the secure message transmission over a
classical-quantum wiretap channel can be used to build a
code for the entanglement transmission over a quantum
channel (cf. [20]). Our technique for entanglement gener-
ation over compound quantum channels is similar to the
proof of entanglement generating capacity over quantum
channels in [20]. The difference between our technique
and the proofs in [20] is that we have to consider the
channel uncertainty (c.f. the discussion in Section VII).
Let P, Q, HP, HQ, θ, and
(
N⊗nt
)
t∈θ be defined as in
Section II (i.e., we assume that θ is finite).
We denote dimHP by a, and denote X := {1, . . . , a}.
Consider the eigen-decomposition of ρP into the or-
thonormal pure quantum state ensemble {p(x), |φx〉P :
x ∈ X}, ∑
x∈X
p(x)|φx〉〈φx|P = ρP .
The distribution p defines a random variable X .
Theorem 3 The entanglement generating capacity of
(Nt)t∈θ is bounded as follows
A ≥ max
p
(
min
t∈θ
χ(p;Qt)−max
t∈θ
χ(p;Et)
)
, (77)
where Qt stands for the quantum outputs that the receiver
observes at the channel state t, and Et the quantum out-
puts at the environment.
(Theorem 3 is weaker than the result in [12], the reason
is that we use for our proof a different quantum channel
representation. For details and the result in [12] cf. Sec-
tion VII.)
Proof. Let ρP → UNtρPU∗Nt be a unitary transforma-
tion which represents Nt (cf. Section VII), where UNt
is a linear operator S(HP) → S(HQE), and E is the
quantum system of the environment. Fix a ρP with
eigen-decomposition
∑
x∈X p(x)|φx〉P〈φx|P. If the chan-
nel state is t, the local output density matrix seen by the
receiver is
trE
(∑
x
p(x)UNt |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nt
)
,
and the local output density matrix seen by the environ-
ment (which we interpret as the wiretapper) is
trQ
(∑
x
p(x)UNt |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nt
)
.
Therefore (Nt)t∈θ defines a compound classical-quantum
wiretap channel (WNt , VNt)t∈θ, where WNt : H
P → HQ,∑
x∈X p(x)|φx〉〈φx|P → trE
(∑
x p(x)UNt |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nt
)
,
and VNt : H
P → HQ, ∑x∈X p(x)|φx〉〈φx|P →
trE
(∑
x p(x)UNt |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nt
)
.
1) Building the encoder and the first part of the decoding
operator
Let
Jn = ⌈2n[mint χ(X;Qt)−maxt χ(X;Et)−2δ]⌉ ,
and
Ln = ⌈2n(maxt χ(X;Et)+δ)⌉ .
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For the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel
(WNt , VNt)t∈θ, since
|{(j, l) : j = 1, . . . , Jn, l = 1, . . . , Ln}|
= Jn · Ln ≤ 2nmint[χ(X;Qt)−δ] ,
if n is large enough, by Theorem 2 and [18], the following
holds. There is a collection of quantum states {ρPnxj,l :
j = 1, . . . , Jn, l = 1, . . . , Ln} ⊂ S(HPn), a collection
of positive-semidefinite operators {Dt,j,l := Dt,xj,l : t ∈
θ, j = 1, . . . , Jn, l = 1, . . . , Ln}, a positive constant β,
and a quantum state ξE
n
t on H
En , such that
tr
(
(DQ
n
t,xj,l
⊗ IEn)UNtρP
n
xj,l
U∗Nt
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ , (78)
and
‖ωEnj,t − ξE
n
t ‖1 < ǫ , (79)
where ωE
n
j,t :=
1
Ln,t
∑Ln,t
l=1 trQn
(
UNtρ
Pn
xj,lU
∗
Nt
)
.
Now the quantum state ρP
n
xj,l may be pure or
mixed. Assume ρP
n
xj,l is a mixed quantum state∑n
i=1 p
′
j,l(i)|κ(i)xj,l〉〈κ(i)xj,l |P
n
, then
n∑
i=1
p′j,l(i)tr
(
(DQ
n
t,xj,l ⊗ IE
n
)UNt |κ(i)xj,l〉〈κ(i)xj,l |P
n
U∗Nt
)
tr
(
(DQ
n
t,xj,l ⊗ IE
n
)UNt(
n∑
i=1
p′j,l(i)|κ(i)xj,l〉〈κ(i)xj,l |P
n
)U∗Nt
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ .
Thus, for all i such that p′j,l(i) ≥ 2
−nβ
1−2−nβ it must hold
tr
(
(DQ
n
t,xj,l
⊗ IEn)UNt |κ(i)xj,l〉〈κ(i)xj,l |P
n
U∗Nt
)
≥ 1− 2−nβ .
If n is large enough, then there is at least one il,j ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that p′j,l(il,j) ≥ 2
−nβ
1−2−nβ . By Theorem 2,
there is a ξE
n
t on H
En , such that
‖ 1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
trQn
(
UNt |κ(il,j)xj,l 〉〈κ(il,j )xj,l |P
n
U∗Nt
)
− ξEnt ‖1 < ǫ .
Thus, (
{|κ(il,j)xj,l 〉〈κ(il,j )xj,l |P
n
: j, l}, {DQnt,xj,l : j, l, t}
)
is a code with the same security rate as(
{ρPnxj,l : j, l}, {DQ
n
t,xj,l : j, l, t}
)
.
Hence we may assume that ρP
n
xj,l is a pure quantum state.
Assume ρP
n
xj,l = |κj,l〉〈κj,l|P
n
. Let HM be a Jn-
dimensional Hilbert space with an orthonormal basis
{|j〉M : j = 1, . . . , Jn}, HL be a Ln-dimensional Hilbert
space with an orthonormal basis {|l〉L : l = 1, . . . , Ln,t},
and Hθ be a |θ|-dimensional Hilbert space with an or-
thonormal basis {|t〉θ : t ∈ θ}. Let |0〉M|0〉L|0〉θ be the
ancillas on HM, HL, and Hθ, respectively, that the re-
ceiver adds. We can (cf. [31]) define a unitary matrix
V Q
nMLθ on HQ
nMLθ such that for any given quantum
state ρQ
n ∈ S(HQn) we have
V Q
nMLθ
(
ρQ
n ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|L ⊗ |0〉〈0|θ
)
(V Q
nMLθ)∗
=
∑
t
∑
j
∑
l
(
DQ
n
t,xj,lρ
Qn
)
⊗ |j〉〈j|M|l〉〈l|L|t〉〈t|θ .
We denote
ψQ
nEnMLθ
j,l,t
:=
(
IE
n ⊗ V QnMLθ
) (
UN ⊗ IMLθ
) [|κj,l〉〈κj,l|Pn
⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|L ⊗ |0〉〈0|θ
] (
UN ⊗ IMLθ
)∗
(
IE
n ⊗ V QnMLθ
)∗
,
in view of (78), we have
F
(
trQnEn
(
ψQ
nEnMLθ
j,l,t
)
, |j〉〈j|M ⊗ |l〉〈l|L ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
≥ 1− ǫ . (80)
By Uhlmann’s theorem (cf. e.g. [40]) we can find a
|ζj,l,t〉QnEn on HQnEn , such that
〈0|θ〈0|L〈0|M〈κj,l|P
n (
UNt ⊗ IMLθ
)∗
(
IE
n ⊗ V QnMLθ
)∗
|ζj,l,t〉Q
nEn |j〉M|l〉L|t〉θ
= F
(
ψQ
nEnMLθ
j,l,t , |ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|Q
nEn
⊗ |j〉〈j|M ⊗ |l〉〈l|L ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
≥ 1− ǫ . (81)
2) Building the seconder part of the decoding operator
We define
|aj,l〉P
nMLθ := |κj,l〉P
n |0〉M|0〉L|0〉θ ,
and
|bj,l,t〉P
nMLθ :=
(
UNt ⊗ IMLθ
)∗ (
IE
n ⊗ V QnMLθ
)∗
|ζj,l,t〉Q
nEn |j〉M|l〉L|t〉θ .
For every j, l, and t, we have 〈aj,l|bj,l,t〉PnMLθ ≥ 1− ǫ.
We define
|aˆj,k〉P
nMLθ :=
1√
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
k
Ln |aj,l〉P
nMLθ ,
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|bˆj,k,t〉P
nMLθ :=
1√
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
k
Ln |bj,l,t〉P
nMLθ ,
and
|bj,k〉P
nMLθ :=
1
|θ|
|θ|∑
t=1
|bˆj,k,t〉P
nMLθ .
For every j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, by (81) it holds
1
Ln
Ln∑
k=1
〈aˆj,k|bj,k〉P
nMLθ
=
1
|θ|
1
Ln
|θ|∑
t=1
Ln∑
k=1
〈aˆj,k|bˆj,k,t〉P
nMLθ
=
1
|θ|
1
Ln
|θ|∑
t=1
Ln∑
l=1
〈aj,l|bj,l,t〉P
nMLθ
≥ 1− ǫ . (82)
Hence there is at least one kj ∈ {1, . . . , Ln} such that
for every j, we have
1− ǫ
≤ e−iskj 〈aˆj,kj |bj,kj 〉P
nMLθ
=
1
|θ|
|θ|∑
t=1
e
−iskj 〈aˆj,kj |bˆj,kj ,t〉P
nMLθ ,
for a suitable phase skj . Since for all t it holds∣∣∣e−iskj 〈aˆj,kj |bˆj,kj ,t〉PnMLθ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, we have
min
t∈θ
∣∣∣e−iskj 〈aˆj,kj |bˆj,kj ,t〉PnMLθ∣∣∣ ≥ 1− |θ|ǫ .
Therefore, there is a suitable phase rkj such that for all
t ∈ θ,
1− |θ|ǫ
≤
∣∣∣e−iskj 〈aˆj,kj |bˆj,kj ,t〉PnMLθ∣∣∣
= e−irkj 〈aˆj,kj |bˆj,kj ,t〉P
nMLθ
= e−irkj
1
Ln
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈aj,l|P
nMLθ
)
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln |bj,l,t〉P
nMLθ
)
. (83)
For every t ∈ θ, we set
|̟j,t〉Q
nEnL :=
√
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
e
−2pii(l kj
Ln
+rkj )|ζj,l,t〉Q
nEn⊗|l〉L
and
|ϑj,t〉Q
nEnMLθ :=
√
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln
[
IE
n ⊗ V QnMLθ
]
(UnN |κj,l〉P
n
)|0〉M|0〉L|0〉θ .
For all t ∈ θ and j ∈ {1, . . . Jn} it holds by (83)
F
(
|ϑj,t〉〈ϑj,t|Q
nEnMLθ,
|̟j,t〉〈̟j,t|Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉〈j|M ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
=
∣∣∣〈ϑj,t|QnEnMLθ|̟j,t〉QnEnL|j〉M |t〉θ∣∣∣
=
1
Ln
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈aj,l|P
nMLθ
)
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln e
−irkj |bj,l,t〉P
nMLθ
)
≥ 1− |θ|ǫ . (84)
Furthermore, since (79) holds there is a quantum state
ξE
n
t , which does not depend on j and l, on H
En such that∥∥∥ξEnt − trQn (UNt |κj,l〉〈κj,l|PnU∗Nt)∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ . (85)
By monotonicity of fidelity, for any l ∈ {1, . . . , Ln}∥∥∥trQn (UNt |κj,l〉〈κj,l|PnU∗Nt)− trQn (|ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|QnEn)∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
[
1− F
(
trQn
(
UNt |κj,l〉〈κj,l|P
n
U∗Nt
)
,
trQn
(
|ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|Q
nEn
))] 12
≤ 2
[
1− F
(
ψQ
nEnMLθ
j,l,t , |ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|Q
nEn
⊗ |j〉〈j|M ⊗ |l〉〈l|L ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)] 1
2
≤ 2√ǫ , (86)
the first inequality holds because for two quantum states
̺ and η, we have 12‖̺− η‖1 ≤
√
1− F (̺, η)2.
By (85) and (86)∥∥∥trQnL (|̟j,t〉〈̟j,t|QnEnL)− ξEnt ∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
trQn
(
|ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|Q
nEn
)
− ξEnt
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
∥∥∥∥trQn (UNt |κj,l〉〈κj,l|PnU∗Nt)
− trQn
(
|ζj,l,t〉〈ζj,l,t|Q
nEn
)∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥ξEnt − trQn (UNt |κj,l〉〈κj,l|PnU∗Nt)∥∥∥
1
≤ 2√ǫ+ ǫ , (87)
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holds for all t ∈ θ and j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}.
In [36] (cf. also [20]) it was shown that when (87) holds,
for every t ∈ θ we can find a unitary operator UQnML(t)
such that if we set
χQ
nEnML
j,j′,t :=
(
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IE
n
)
(
|̟j,t〉〈̟j,t|Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉〈j′|M
)(
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IE
n
)∗
,
then
F
(
|ξt〉〈ξt|Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉〈j′|M, χQnEnMLj,j′,t
)
≥ 1− 4ǫ− 4√ǫ ,
(88)
where |ξt〉QnEnL is chosen so that |ξt〉〈ξt|QnEnL is a pu-
rification of ξE
n
t on H
QnEnL.
3) Defining the code
We can now define our entanglement generating code.
Let t′ be arbitrary in θ. The sender prepares the quantum
state
1
Jn
1
Ln

 Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln |κj,l〉P
n |j〉A



 Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈j|A〈κj,l|P
n

 , (89)
keeps the system A, and sends the system Pn through
the channel N⊗nt′ , i.e., the resulting quantum state is
1
Jn
1
Ln
(
IA ⊗ UnNt′
) [ Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln |j〉A|κj,l〉P
n



 Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈κj,l|P
n〈j|A

](IA ⊗ UnNt′
)∗
=
1
Jn
1
Ln

 Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln UnNt′ |κj,l〉P
n
)


 Jn∑
j=1
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈κj,l|P
n
(UnNt′ )
∗
)
〈j|A

 .
The receiver subsequently applies the decoding operator
τQ
n → trQnLθ
[(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
V Q
nMLθ
(
τQ
n ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|L ⊗ |0〉〈0|θ
)
V Q
nMLθ∗
(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)∗]
, (90)
to his outcome.
3.1) The resulting quantum state after performing the de-
coding operator
We define
ιAQ
nEnMLθ
t′
:=
(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IAE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
(V Q
nMLθ ⊗ IAEn)
(
1
Jn
1
Ln

 Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln UnNt′ |κj,l〉P
n
)


 Jn∑
j=1
(
Ln∑
l=1
e−2piil
kj
Ln 〈κj,l|P
n
(UnNt′ )
∗
)
〈j|A


⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|L ⊗ |0〉〈0|θ
)
(V Q
nMLθ ⊗ IAEn)∗(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IAE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)∗
=
(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IAE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)

 1
Jn
(
Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A|ϑj,t′〉Q
nEnMLθ)(
Jn∑
j=1
〈ϑj,t′ |Q
nEnMLθ〈j|A)


(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IAE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)∗
, (91)
then the resulting quantum state after performing the
decoding operator is trQnEnLθ(ι
AQnEnMLθ
t′ ).
3.2) The fidelity of 1Jn
∑Jn
j=1
∑Jn
j′=1 χ
QnEnML
j,j′,t′ ⊗ |j〉〈j|A⊗
|t′〉〈t′|θ and the actual quantum state
(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IAE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)
(∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) ⊗ IE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
)∗
= IAE
n ⊗
∑
t∈θ
UQ
nML
(t) (U
QnML
(t) )
∗ ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ
= IAQ
nEnMLθ ,∑
t∈θ U
QnML
(t) ⊗ IE
n ⊗ |t〉〈t|θ is unitary.
Because of this unitarity and by (84)
F

ιAQnEnMLθt′ , 1Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Jn∑
j′=1
χQ
nEnML
j,j′,t′ ⊗ |j〉〈j′|A ⊗ |t′〉〈t′|θ


= F
(
1
Jn
(
Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A|ϑj,t′〉Q
nEnMLθ)(
Jn∑
j=1
〈ϑj,t′ |Q
nEnMLθ〈j|A),
1
Jn
(
Jn∑
j=1
|̟j,t′〉Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉A ⊗ |j〉M)
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(Jn∑
j=1
〈j|M ⊗ 〈j|A ⊗ 〈̟j,t′ |Q
nEnL)⊗ |t′〉〈t′|θ
)
=
1
Jn
∣∣∣∣
( Jn∑
j=1
〈ϑj,t′ |Q
nEnMLθ
)
( Jn∑
j=1
|̟j,t′〉Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉M ⊗ |t′〉θ
)∣∣∣∣
≥ 1− |θ|ǫ . (92)
3.3) The fidelity of 1Jn
∑Jn
j=1
∑Jn
j′=1 χ
QnEnML
j,j′,t′ ⊗|j〉〈j′|A⊗
|t′〉〈t′|θ and the standard maximally entanglement state
By (88) we have
F
(
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Jn∑
j′=1
χQ
nEnML
j,j′,t′ ⊗ |t′〉〈t′|θ ⊗ |j〉〈j′|A,
1
Jn
(
Jn∑
j=1
|ξt′ 〉Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉A ⊗ |j〉M ⊗ |t′〉θ)
(
Jn∑
j=1
〈ξt′ |Q
nEnL ⊗ 〈j|A ⊗ 〈j|M ⊗ 〈t′|θ)
)
≥ 1− 4ǫ− 4√ǫ . (93)
3.4) The fidelity of the actual quantum state and the stan-
dard maximally entanglement state
Since for two quantum states ̺ and η, it holds
1− F (̺, η) ≤ 1
2
‖̺− η‖1 ≤
√
1− F (̺, η)2 ,
for three quantum states ̺, η, and υ, we have
F (̺, η)
≥ 1− 1
2
‖̺− η‖1
≥ 1− 1
2
‖̺− υ‖1 − 1
2
‖υ − η‖1
≥ 1−
√
1− F (̺, υ)2 −
√
1− F (υ, η)2 .
Combining (92) and (93), for all t′ ∈ θ we have
F
(
trQnEnLθ(ι
AQnEnMLθ
t′ ),
(
Jn∑
j=1
|j〉A ⊗ |j〉M)(
Jn∑
j=1
〈j|A ⊗ 〈j|M)
)
≥ F
(
ιAQ
nEnMLθ
t′ ,
1
Jn
(
Jn∑
j=1
|ξt′〉Q
nEnL ⊗ |j〉A ⊗ |j〉M ⊗ |t′〉θ)
(
Jn∑
j=1
〈ξt′ |Q
nEnL ⊗ 〈j|A ⊗ 〈j|M ⊗ 〈t′|θ)
)
≥ 1−
√
2|θ|ǫ − |θ|2ǫ2 −
√
8
√
ǫ− 16ǫ2 − 32ǫ√ǫ− 8ǫ
(94)
≥ 1−
√
2|θ|√ǫ−
√
8 4
√
ǫ . (95)
This means that if n is large enough, then for any
positive δ and ǫ, there is an (n,
√
2|θ|√ǫ +√8 4√ǫ) code
with rate
min
t
χ(X ;Qt)−max
t
χ(X ;Et)− 2δ .
Proposition 1 The entanglement generating capacity of
(Nt)t∈θ with CSI at the encoder is
ACSI = lim
n→∞
1
n
min
t∈θ
max
ρ∈S(H)Qn
IC(ρ;Nt
⊗n) . (96)
Proof. As the authors of [18] showed, after receiving a
dummy code word as the first block, the receiver also can
have CSI. Then we have the case where both the sender
and the receiver have CSI. But this case is equivalent to
the case where we only have one channel (Nt) instead
of a family of channels {(Nt) : t = 1, . . . , |θ|}, and we
may assume it is the worst channel. The bits that we
use to detect the CSI are large but constant, so it is neg-
ligible compared to the rest. By [20], the entanglement
generating capacity of the quantum channel Nt is
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
ρ∈S(H)Qn
IC(ρ;N
⊗n
t ) .
The proof of the converse is similar to those given in
the proof of Theorem 2, where we consider a worst t′.
Proposition 2 The entanglement generating capacity of
(Nt)t∈θ with feedback is bounded as follows
Afeed ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
min
t∈θ
max
ρ∈S(H)Qn
IC(ρ;Nt
⊗n) . (97)
Proof. As the authors of [18] showed, the receiver can de-
tect the channel state t correctly after receiving a dummy
word as the first block. Then he can send t back to the
sender via feedback.
Remark 8 Feedback can improve the channel capacity of
quantum channels in some cases (c.f. [27]). Thus it can
be possible that the lower bound in Proposition 2 is not
tight. For a one-way entanglement distillation protocol
using secret key, cf. [21].
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VII. FURTHER NOTES
In this section we will discuss the proof of our result
of the previous section.
Let P, Q, HP, and HQ be defined as in Section II. Let
N be a quantum channel S(HP) → S(HQ). In general,
there are two ways to represent a quantum channel, i.
e. a completely positive trace preserving map S(HP)→
S(HQ), with linear algebraic tools.
1. Operator Sum Decomposition (Kraus Representation)
N(ρ) =
K∑
i=1
AiρAi
∗ , (98)
where A1, . . . , AK (Kraus operators) are linear operators
S(HP) → S(HQ) (cf.[26], [6], and [31]). They satisfy
the completeness relation
∑K
i=1 Ai
∗Ai = IHP . The rep-
resentation of a quantum channel N according to (98)
is not unique. Let A1, . . . , AK and B1, . . . , BK′ be two
sets of Kraus operators (by appending zero operators
to the shorter list of operation elements we may ensure
that K ′ = K). Suppose A1, . . . , AK represents N , then
B1, . . . , BK also represents N if and only if there exist a
K ×K unitary matrix (ui,j)i,j=1,...,K such that for all i
we have Ai =
∑K
j=1 ui,jBj (cf. [31]).
2. Isometric Extension (Stinespring Dilation)
N(ρ) = trE (UNρU
∗
N ) , (99)
where UN is a linear operator S(HP) → S(HQE) such
that U∗NUN = IHP , and E is the quantum system of
the environment (cf. [37], [6], and also cf. [38] for a
more general Stinespring Dilation Theorem). HE can be
chosen such that dimHE ≤ (dimHP)2. The isometric
extension of a quantum channel N according to (99) is
not unique either. Let U and U ′ be two linear operators
S(HP) → S(HQE). Suppose U represents N , then U ′
also represents N if and only if U and U ′ are unitarily
equivalent.
It is well known that we can reduce each of
these two representations of the quantum chan-
nel from the other one. Let A1, . . . , AK be a
set of Kraus operators which represents N . Let
{|j〉E : j = 1, . . . ,K} be an orthonormal system on
HE. Then UN =
∑K
j=1 Aj ⊗ |j〉E is an isometric exten-
sion which represents N , since
(∑K
j=1 Aj ⊗ |j〉E
)
ρ
(∑K
k=1Ak ⊗ |k〉E
)∗
=
∑K
j=1AjρAj
∗ and(∑K
j=1 Aj ⊗ |j〉E
)∗ (∑K
k=1Ak ⊗ |k〉E
)
=
∑K
j=1 Aj
∗Aj .
For the other way around, every isometric extension
UN that represents N can be written in the form
UN =
∑K
j=1Aj ⊗ |j〉E, i.e. if the sender sends ρ,
and if the environment’s measurement gives |i〉E, the
receiver’s outcome will be AiρAi
∗. Here A1, . . . , AK
is a set of Kraus operators which represents N , and
{|j〉E : j = 1, . . . ,K} is an orthonormal system on HE.
Using either of both methods to represent a quantum
channel, one can show that (cf. [20]) the entanglement
generating capacity of a quantum channel N is
A(N) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
ρ∈S(H)Qn
IC(ρ;N
⊗n) . (100)
The Kraus representation describes the dynamics of
the principal system without having to explicitly consider
properties of the environment, whose dynamics are often
unimportant. All that we need to know is the system
of the receiver alone; this simplifies calculations. In [25],
an explicit construction of a quantum error correction
code (both perfect and approximate information recov-
ery) with the Kraus operators is given. In the Stinespring
dilation, we have a natural interpretation of the system of
the environment. From the Stinespring dilation, we can
conclude that the receiver can detect almost all quantum
information if and only if the channel releases almost
no information to the environment. In [36], an alterna-
tive way to build a quantum error correction code (both
perfect and approximate information recovery) is given
using this fact. The disadvantage is that we suppose it is
suboptimal for calculating the entanglement generating
capacity of a compound quantum channel without CSI
at the encoder.
In [12], the entanglement generating capacity for the
compound quantum channel is determined, using a quan-
tum error correction code of [25], which is built by Kraus
operators. Their result is the following. The entangle-
ment generating capacity of a quantum wiretap channel
N = (Nt)t∈θ is
A(N) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
ρ∈S(H)Qn
min
t∈θ
IC(ρ;Nt
⊗n) . (101)
This result is stronger than our result in Theorem 3. This
is due to the fact that we use for our proof a quan-
tum error correction code of [36], which is based upon
the Stinespring dilation. If we use the Kraus operators
to represent a compound quantum channel, we have a
bipartite system, and for calculating the entanglement
generating capacity of a compound quantum channel,
we can use the technique which is similar to the case
of a single quantum channel. However, if we use the
Stinespring dilation to represent a compound quantum
channel, we have a tripartite system which includes the
sender, the receiver, and in addition, the environment.
Unlike in the case of a single quantum channel, for com-
pound quantum channel we have to deal with uncertainty
at the environment. If the sender knows the CSI, the
transmitters can build an (n, ǫ) code for entanglement
generating with rate mint [χ(X ;Qt)− χ(X ;Et)] − δ =
mint∈θ IC(ρ;Nt) − δ (Proposition 1) for any positive δ
and ǫ. This result is optimal (cf. [12]). But if the
sender does not know the CSI, he has to build an en-
coding operator by considering every possible channel
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state for the environment. Therefore the maximal rate
that we can achieve is mint χ(X ;Qt) − maxt χ(X ;Et),
but not mint∈θ IC(ρ;Nt) = mint [χ(X ;Qt)− χ(X ;Et)].
This is only a lower bound of the entanglement generat-
ing capacity. It is unknown if we can achieve the stronger
result (101) using the Stinespring dilation.
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